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This event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging study
compared neural correlates of executive function (cognitive set-
shifting) in 28 healthy participants with either high (HIQ) or average
(AIQ) intelligence. Despite comparable behavioral performance
(except for slower reactions), the AIQ participants showed greater
(especially prefrontal) activation during response selection; the HIQ
participants showed greater activation (especially parietal) during
feedback evaluation. HIQ participants appeared to engage cognitive
resources to support more efﬁcient strategies (planning during
feedback in preparation for the upcoming response) which resulted
in faster responses and less need for response inhibition and
conﬂict resolution. Whether greater intelligence is associated with
more or less brain activity (the ‘‘neural efﬁciency’’ debate) depends
therefore on the speciﬁc component of the task being examined as
well as the brain region recruited. One implication is that caution
must be exercised when drawing conclusions from differences in
activation between groups of individuals in whom IQ may differ
(e.g., psychiatric vs. control samples).
Keywords: event-related, executive functioning, fMRI, intelligence, neural
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Introduction
Executive function broadly deﬁnes higher cognitive abilities that
enable individuals to strategically control and execute goal-
directed behaviors in an uncertain and changing environment.
Executive function has been conceptualized as a ‘‘supervisory
attentional system’’ which plans, prioritizes, allocates attention,
and recognizes corrective feedback to guide appropriate
decisions (Norman and Shallice 1986). This concept has much
in common with the ‘‘central executive’’ component of the
working memory model which interacts with short-term verbal
andvisuospatialstorestomanipulateinformationduringcomplex
decision making (Baddeley and Hitch 1974; Baddeley 2001).
Executive function and intelligence are thought to be related
psychological constructs that underlie behavioral control and
problem solving. The general factor or ‘‘g’’ of human intel-
ligence is deﬁned as underlying all cognitive abilities (Spearman
1928) and therefore correlates with psychometric tests of
intelligence (Jensen 1998). Psychometric batteries such as
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) were devised to
measure intelligence in general (i.e., both crystallized and ﬂuid
intelligence) and are an approximation of ‘‘g’’ plus the cognitive
skills speciﬁc to each test used (Colom et al. 2002). In healthy
participants, WAIS-Revised IQ scores moderately correlate (r =
0.38--0.63) with a wide variety of executive functioning tests
(Obonsawin et al. 2002). Although there is an ongoing debate
over the nature of the relationship between IQ and scoring on
neuropsychological tests (Dodrill 1997, 1999; Horton 1999;
Tremont1999),morecomplexneuropsychologicaltests(which
include measures of verbal and visual memory, complex at-
tention, working memory and executive functioning) can be
expected to strongly correspond to IQ (Jung et al. 2000). Thus,
executive function and intelligence are thought to have strong
psychometric associations and even share overlapping neural
regions (Duncan 2005; Burgess et al. 2006). Indeed some
authorsregardexecutivefunctionandﬂuidintelligence(‘‘gF’’) as
one and the same (Duncan et al. 1995). Brain imaging studies
indicate that high ‘‘g’’ tasks compared with low ‘‘g’’ (regardless of
an individual’s IQ) require greater recruitment of a network
involving lateral prefrontal and posterior parietal cortices—
regions that are also strongly implicated in executive function
processes (Duncan and Owen 2000; Buchsbaum et al. 2005).
Of some controversy however is whether people with
higher intelligence employ greater or lesser activation in these
brain regions. According to the capacity-constrained view of
cognition, decision-making processes rely on underlying neural
systems whose efﬁciency is affected by several factors in-
cluding the neurochemistry, interconnectivity and strategies
they employ (Parks et al. 1989; Just and Carpenter 1992). Thus
‘‘neural efﬁciency’’ results from individual differences in the
amount of neural resources available for cognitive processing
(Haier et al. 1992; Rypma and D’Esposito 1999; Reichle et al.
2000; Rypma et al. 2002). Several studies using positron
emission tomography (PET) to measure brain activity-induced
changes in glucose metabolism have concluded an inverse
correlation between neural activity and IQ score (or task
performance) which is consistent with the neural efﬁciency
hypothesis (Haier et al. 1992, 2000). This is not always the case
however. Electroencephalography studies (which reﬂect
summed electrical potentials across large neuronal popula-
tions) indicate that IQ-related task proﬁciency is sometimes
associated with greater and other times lesser neural activity
(Van Rooy et al. 2001; Jausovec and Jausovec 2004a; Neubauer
et al. 2004) and may depend on the nature of the task being
measured. In blood-oxygen-level--dependent (BOLD) func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (BOLD fMRI which reﬂects
local changes in the ratio of deoxygenated to oxygenated
hemoglobin), tasks that demand more complex reasoning
typically result in greater neural activity for those individuals
with higher IQ—which is inconsistent with the neural efﬁ-
ciency hypothesis (Gray et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2006). Although it
is possible that methodological differences among these studies
(i.e., each technique measures different neuronal phenomena)
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worthwhile investigating the controversial neural efﬁciency
hypothesis. fMRI offers high spatial resolution and the pos-
sibility of event-related designs, hence the purpose of this study
was to determine whether IQ-related differences in fMRI
activation (increases or decreases) could be linked to speciﬁc
cognitive subcomponents of an executive function task such as
strategic response planning, goal-directed attention changes,
working memory maintenance, response inhibition, and con-
ﬂict resolution.
Methods
Participants
The study protocol was approved by the local institutional ethics
committee and informed consent was obtained from 28 healthy right-
handed volunteers who were proﬁcient in English, free of medications
or caffeine prior to scanning, and had no history of neurological or
psychiatric disorders. These 28 participants were selected from a larger
sample of 160, based on their performance on the Wechsler Ab-
breviated Scale of Intelligence. First, a group of participants whose IQ
was close to the population average (100) was randomly selected. A
second group was then chosen where IQ was at least one population
standard deviation (15 points) above 100. Where possible we at-
tempted to match on other factors such as age, years of education and
demographics. The 2 groups differed only in terms of their Full Scale IQ
(mean for average IQ = 98.9 ± 3.3, range = 93--104; mean for High IQ =
124.5 ± 8.4, range = 115--135; 2-tailed independent sample t-test, t(26) =
13.3, P < 0.0001). The 2 groups did not signiﬁcantly differ in terms of
age (t(26) = 0.8, P = 0.4) and years of education (t(26) = 1.12, P = 0.28):
Average IQ group (mean age = 29.9 ± 11.9; mean years of education =
13.1 ± 2.2; 7 females) and High IQ group (mean IQ = 124.5 ± 8.4,
range = 115--135; mean age = 26.3 ± 12.2; mean years of education =
13.8 ± 1.5; 9 females).
Experimental Task and Design
Participants were trained on a computerized set shifting task before
entering the scanner to ensure that performance deﬁcits were not
attributable to misunderstandings about sorting criteria or the concept
of sorting itself (Stuss et al. 1983). Brieﬂy, each participant was trained
for about 5 min to gain matching experience on all 3 rules (color,
shape, and number) and was asked to comment on how they were
solving the task to ensure appropriate understanding of the instruc-
tions. During response selection, 5 cards appeared on a blue screen.
Four equally spaced reference cards appeared along the top of the
screen and remained unchanged throughout the experiment (see
Fig. 1). A target card appeared centrally and was to be matched with
1 of 4 reference cards, according to a randomly selected rule (colour,
shape, or number). The target card was never identical to a reference
card, but shared the same color, shape or number of composite items.
The subject was allowed 4sec in which to respond, otherwise the
words ‘‘too late’’ would appear and the trial would terminate. Following
the subject’s response, a bar appeared under the chosen reference card.
At the end of the 4sec period, the stimuli disappeared and were
replaced by ﬁxation (a white cross centered on the blue background).
Figure 1. On each trial the subject matched the card at the bottom of the screen
(which varied on each trial) with 1 of the 4 top cards at the top of the screen. This
ﬁgure depicts a typical sequence of the 8 event types during cognitive set shifting. In
the ﬁrst row responding was based on the rule established during previous trials, and
conﬁrmed by positive feedback; in the second row the rule continued to be
maintained but feedback indicated that the rule had changed. In the third row a new
rule had to be chosen from the 2 remaining candidates (and the previous rule
inhibited). If positive feedback was received (1stPF) this would guide subsequent card
selection. If negative feedback (2þNF) was received further attempts (RS2þNF)
would be made until the correct rule was identiﬁed. The response (required within
4 s) was indicated by a white horizontal bar under the chosen card. A ‘‘ﬁxation cross’’
then appeared for 5 s after which feedback (positive or negative) was presented for
0.5 s. After a variable ﬁxation interval the next trial began. Note: ‘‘PF’’ 5 positive
feedback; ‘‘NF’’ 5 negative feedback; ‘‘1st’’ 5 ﬁrst; ‘‘2þ’’ 5 subsequent; and
‘‘RS’’ 5 response selection following feedback.
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appeared: ‘‘Right’’ or ‘‘Wrong’’ in white letters centered on the blue
background for correct or incorrect responses, respectively. The
feedback stimulus appeared for 500 ms, the display then changed to
ﬁxation until the onset of the next trial. Variable periods of ﬁxation
(3, 6, or 9 s) were inserted between trials to allow sufﬁcient separation
and jittering of trials to facilitate deconvolution. The average trial
onset asynchrony was 14sec. After a random number of between 3 and
5 successive correct feedback events (the ﬁrst of which was declared
an ‘‘update’’ event; the remaining trials were considered ‘‘maintenance’’
events), another rule was randomly selected. The next occurrence
of negative feedback (the ‘‘shift’’ feedback) gave the subject the
opportunity to realize that the rule had changed and to take ap-
propriate action. All other trials on which negative feedback was
presented were considered to be ‘‘generate’’ events. Each scanning
session consisted of 5 runs and each run lasted for 8 min.
Imaging Protocol
Functional imaging was performed on a 1.5-Tesla Symphony MRI
scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) using blipped gradient-echo
echoplanar imaging (time repetition = 3000 ms; ﬂip angle = 90;6 43 64
pixel matrix; ﬁeld of view [FOV] = 192 3 192 mm). Each run consisted
of 156 whole brain acquisitions (32 oblique axial slices, 3-mm-thick,
0.3-mm gap between slices, descending interleaved slice acquisition)
acquired in a plane parallel to the line between the anterior and
posterior commissures on the sagittal scout images. A high-resolution
(256 3 256 pixel matrix; FOV = 206 3 206 mm) T1-weighted anatomical
reference was acquired using a magnetization prepared rapid
acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence that yielded 80 slices
of approximately 2-mm thickness in the coronal plane.
Image Data Analysis
The images were processed and analyzed using Brain Voyager QX
(Version 1.10, Brain Innovation, the Netherlands). Slice scan time
correction followed by motion correction, spatial smoothing (8-mm
FWHM) and linear trend removal were performed. The functional
images were registered to the MPRAGE images, and the resulting
realigned data were then transformed into Talairach space prior to
computation of a random effects general linear model with separate
regressors (relative to a ﬁxation baseline) for each condition. Each
regressor was convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response
function (HRF) peaking 6 s after presentation onset of the card stimuli
or feedback, respectively. Jittering the ﬁxation interval between
feedback evaluation and the ensuing response selection aided in
the deconvolution of events. Furthermore, the variable nature of the
feedback (sometimes positive, other times negative) ensured that the
speciﬁc type of response selection and feedback evaluation were not
correlated in time. Deconvolution was further aided by the separation
of ﬁrst and subsequent instances of each event type. The inclusion of
a ﬁxation baseline also allowed the estimation of HRF predictors for
each of these conditions of interest (rather than simply revealing
a signiﬁcant difference between 2 conditions). Thus, we examined
whether each condition was activating or deactivating with respect to
the ﬁxation baseline. Regions of interest (ROIs) were selected based on
group level differences, and the resulting maps were thresholded (P <
0.05 corrected) using minimum cluster size estimation (Goebel et al.
2006). After setting the voxel-level threshold to P < 0.01 (uncorrected),
the maps were corrected at whole brain level using 1000 iterations of
Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the minimum cluster size threshold
that would yield a false positive rate of 5%. Voxels activated above the
indicated threshold (P < 0.05 corrected) were selected and the peak of
activation for each ROI was reported.
Results
Behavioral Results
The number (mean ± SE) of rules identiﬁed did not differ
signiﬁcantly between the Average IQ (23.2 ± 1.1) and High IQ
(25.6 ± 0.5) groups, nor did the average number of errors
made when identifying each rule (1.5 ± 0.3 and 1.0 ± 0.1,
respectively). The mean reaction times taken to match cards
were however signiﬁcantly slower (t(26) = 4.06, P < 0.001) in
the Average IQ group (1806 ± 53 ms) compared the High IQ
group (1470 ± 72 ms).
Imaging Data
To study how the activation pattern changed across different
stages of cognitive set shifting, 8 experimental conditions were
compared against a (ﬁxation) baseline. These 8 conditions
represented the progression of cognitive set shifting processes
from the time of the ﬁrst negative feedback signal (1stNF)
indicating the rule change, to the response selection event
(RS2+PF) associated with maintaining an already established
rule (see Fig. 1).
Group Differences During Response Selection
When the card stimuli were present during a response selection
event, participants would need to select the appropriate
response from competing alternatives, and after a rule shift,
ignore the prepotent and now inappropriate stimulus-response
contingency that had been established during recent trials
(Graham et al. 2009). Response selection events would decrease
in difﬁculty with increasing time since rule shift when the new
rule had been established following conﬁrmatory positive
feedback. The main trend in group differences for response
selection events across several regions was that the Average IQ
group showed greater activation for response selection
compared with the High IQ group (see Table 1). Consistent
with the neural efﬁciency hypothesis, the function of some of
these regions would suggest a greater cognitive challenge
facing the Average IQ group. For example, the right inferior
frontal gyrus (Brodmann Area [BA] 46) which research suggests
is strongly implicated in inhibition of prepotent (but inappro-
priate) responses (Konishi et al. 1998) showed greater
activation in Average IQ participants during response selection.
Activation in this region peaked on response selection events
immediately following negative feedback (when the need to
inhibit the prepotent response would be greatest) and di-
minished with increasing time since rule shift (see Fig. 2A). A
similar activation proﬁle was observed in the anterior cingulate
gyrus cortex (BA 31/32), which is thought to be involved in
resolution of response conﬂict (Garavan et al. 1999; Braver et al.
2001) and again activation was most pronounced immediately
after the rule change, that is, during the presence of more
competing responses for selection when the identity of the new
rule was unknown (Fig. 2B). If the Average IQ participants were
to have experienced greater conﬂict (e.g., from competing
response alternatives) then this could explain their relatively
greater activation in these regions observed compared with the
High IQ participants. Another area showing greater activation
among Average IQ participants during response selection was
the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47) (see Fig. 2C). This
ventrolateral prefrontal region (VLPFC) is implicated in re-
trieving rule meanings and actively maintaining representations
of the rule contingencies (Bunge 2004). A functionally related
region (lateral BA 6) which was also more activated in the
Average IQ group is thought to coordinate the rule and motor
programs to allow execution of the response (Bunge et al.
2005). Thus greater activation in Average IQ participants could
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resolution and working memory to support the online
maintenance and consideration of more response options and
candidate rules during response selection.
Another region consistent with neural efﬁciency that showed
greater activity during response selection for the Average IQ
participants was the right superior temporal gyrus (BA 38/42).
The lateral temporal lobes represent semantic features of
abstract rules (Bunge 2004), and greater activation in Average
IQ participants is consistent with our observations that Average
IQ participants were using more verbal strategies (e.g., ‘‘match
on color’’) to guide response selection on the ensuing trial. In
contrast, the postexperiment debrieﬁng revealed that many
High IQ (but not Average IQ) participants reported detailed
spatial response strategies in relation to the abstract rules (e.g.,
ﬁrst select a candidate dimension ‘‘color’’ and when the card
stimuli appear during the next response selection, press the left
key if the card is red; see Fig. 1). This observation is consistent
with another study in which higher IQ participants reported
greater use of spatial strategies compared with those with lower
IQ who reported greater use of verbal strategies (Jausovec and
Jausovec 2004b).
Two regions however showed greater activation in High IQ
compared with Average IQ participants (inconsistent with the
neural efﬁciency hypothesis). These included the right superior
frontal gyrus (BA 8/9) and right inferior occipital gyrus (BA 19)
which is considered to support the memory mechanism for
low-level visual attributes (Magnussen 2000). This could have
facilitated visual scanning of the candidate and reference card at
response selection to enable a faster response.
Group Differences during Feedback Evaluation
The feedback stimulus provided negative or positive reinforce-
ment about the last response thus enabling the participant to
adapt their response strategy on subsequent trials. The ﬁrst
negative feedback (1stNF) presented after a series of positive
feedback events signaled the need for participants to shift from
the previously correct and prepotent rule to a strategy based on
1 of the 2 remaining rule candidates. Any subsequent negative
feedback (2+NF) would prompt participants to continue
generating rule candidates, until the new rule was identiﬁed.
The ﬁrst positive feedback (1stPF) would cue participants to
remember and continue performing based on this new rule.
Subsequent conﬁrmatory positive feedback (2+PF) would
conﬁrm the established rule and its continued rehearsal in
memory. This rule would then be maintained until another rule
change occurred as indicated by the next 1stNF signal. In
general, activation during feedback evaluation should therefore
reﬂect cognitive processes that support planning of a response
strategy in preparation for the ensuing trial.
In contrast to the trend observed during response selection,
presentation of feedback (positive or negative) resulted in
greater activation for the High IQ compared with the Average
IQ group (see Table 2). Regions showing group differences
included 1) bilateral caudate nuclei; 2) left inferior (BA 40),
bilateral superior (BA 7) parietal lobe and precuneus (BA 7); 3)
medial frontal gyrus (BA 6); 4) posterior cingulate (BA 23), and
5) bilateral lingual gyri (BA 17) and bilateral fusiform gyri
(BA 37/19). Inspection of the parameter estimates for most of
these ROIs (see Fig. 2D--F) indicated that the Average IQ group
failed to produce as much activation during feedback
evaluation as did the High IQ group. These group differences
are inconsistent with the neural efﬁciency hypothesis and
instead suggest that the High IQ individuals were engaged in
greater cognitive processing which we will argue reﬂects more
strategic response planning at the time of feedback evaluation.
Discussion
The present fMRI study compared the event-related fMRI
activation during cognitive set shifting performance between
High IQ and Average IQ participants. Despite comparable
behavioral performance (except for faster reaction times
among the High IQ participants) there were striking imaging
differences between the High and Average IQ groups during
response selection and feedback evaluation events. During
response selection the Average IQ group showed relatively
greater activation in the prefrontal and anterior cingulate
regions. Conversely, during feedback evaluation, the High IQ
group showed relatively greater activation in parietal, caudate,
fusiform and occipital regions. The ﬁndings provide evidence
both consistent with (during response selection) and in-
consistent with (during feedback evaluation) the neural
efﬁciency hypothesis, indicating that the brain region being
recruited and the level of activation are dependent on the
speciﬁc cognitive set-shifting component of the task. We
suggest that the Average IQ group was less strategic in
evaluating feedback about the preceding trial than the High
IQ group and as a result experienced greater response conﬂict
from competing options during the ensuing response selection.
Table 1
High IQ versus Average IQ group differences in activation during across response selection
events (RS1stNF, RS2þNF, RS1stPF, RS2þPF)
Anatomical region Talairach (xyz )B A m m
3
RS1stNF
Average IQ [ High IQ
Left inferior frontal gyrus  28 25  4 47 483
Left anterior cingulate gyrus  10 17 34 32 363
Left superior temporal gyrus  50 9  15 38 402
Right inferior frontal gyrus 47 7 26 46 1660
Left superior temporal gyrus  36 5  15 38 464
Right middle frontal gyrus 24  3 52 6 2046
Left anterior cingulate gyrus  11  3 45 31 660
Right superior temporal gyrus 54  6 5 42 4665
Right postcentral gyrus 54  8 19 3 3503
Right putamen 26  9 11 — 1147
Left hippocampus  29  12  18 — 687
Left postcentral gyrus  44  18 45 4 1365
Right superior parietal lobule 31  41 52 7 951
RS21NF
High IQ [ Average IQ
Right superior frontal gyrus 10 40 39 8/9 1172
Right inferior occipital gyrus 32  81  7 19 605
Average IQ [ High IQ
Right inferior frontal gyrus 45 7 26 46 1719
Right insula 39  4  10 — 409
Left precentral gyrus  54  12 47 6 325
Left superior occipital gyrus  33  73 25 19 389
RS1stPF
High IQ [ Average IQ
Right inferior occipital gyrus 31  81  5 19 767
Average IQ [ High IQ
Left inferior frontal gyrus  25 25  6 47 388
Right middle frontal gyrus 25  7 50 6 1083
Right postcentral gyrus 34  26 49 3 486
Left superior occipital gyrus  38  75 24 19 598
RS21PF
Average IQ [ High IQ
Left postcentral gyrus  48  16 50 4 1104
Left superior occipital gyrus  38  75 25 19 735
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Inhibition and Experienced Greater Conﬂict during
Response Selection
The overall pattern of higher activation among the Average IQ
participants during response selection may reﬂect the experi-
ence of greater cognitive demands (or the use of more
inefﬁcient strategies) compared with High IQ participants. As
discussed earlier, greater activation in the right inferior frontal
gyrus and anterior cingulate (BA 32) is implicated in inhibitory
control of behavior, monitoring of information, error detection
and conﬂict processing, and could explain greater activation in
the Average IQ participants (Konishi et al. 1998; Garavan et al.
1999; Konishi et al. 1999; Braver et al. 2001). Research ﬁndings
support the involvement of the VLPLC in working memory
(Owen et al. 2005). Greater VLPFC activation could also reﬂect
greater demands on working memory to support the consid-
eration of more response options and candidate rules during
response selection. These results are consistent with earlier
studies that found greater VLPFC activity during working
memory maintenance in subjects who performed more slowly
and less accurately (Rypma et al. 2002) and in low memory
span relative to high memory span participants during a simple
reading task (Osaka et al. 2004). Thus greater activation among
the Average IQ participants is consistent with the neural
efﬁciency hypothesis, and our interpretation is that this reﬂects
a more inefﬁcient cognitive strategy. Inconsistent with the
neural efﬁciency hypothesis, the superior frontal gyrus (BA 8/
9) which borders on the cingulate sulcus and BA 19 (inferior
occipital gyrus) showed relatively greater activation in the
High IQ participants. Functional connectivity between these
2 regions has been considered an important component of ‘‘g’’
and is thought to help resolve competition among incoming
visual stimuli (Haier et al. 2003).
High IQ Participants Plan Future Response Strategies
during Feedback Evaluation
During feedback evaluation, the High IQ group marshaled
greater activation in many regions which are associated with
complex reasoning and strategic response preparation. For
example, greater caudate activity in High IQ participants could
reﬂect the formulation of response strategies during feedback
evaluation in preparation for the next trial. A study of associative
conditioning in which monkeys learned to discriminate between
visual cues showed that caudate activity preceded activity in the
prefrontal cortex, thus reﬂecting more rapid anticipation of the
correct discrimination choice; activation in the prefrontal cortex
in contrast reﬂected a slower learning mechanism (Pasupathy
and Miller 2005). One interpretation is that the caudate nuclei
rapidly support the formation of a heuristic response strategy,
which is useful under time pressure. Thus in the present study,
greater caudate activation in High IQ participants could have
enabled advance planning of the forthcoming response which
Figure 2. Regions of interest graphs depicting the signal change across the events from rule shift (A) right inferior frontal gyrus, (B) left anterior cingulate, (C) left inferior frontal
gyrus, (D) caudate nucleus, (E) medial frontal gyrus, (F) left inferior parietal lobe.
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verbalized during the postexperiment debrieﬁng. At the
feedback stage, greater activation was also observed in the
medial frontal gyrus (BA 6)—a region which has also been
implicated in motor planning of tasks such as decision making,
discrimination, and reasoning (Talati and Hirsch 2005). In the
present study employing such strategies during feedback
evaluation would have enabled the High IQ participants to
respond faster and more automatically during response selec-
tion. The bilaterial superior parietal regions (BA 7) are
implicated in task set reconﬁguration (Brass and von Cramon
2004; Crone et al. 2006) in the present study and also
showed greater activation in High IQ participants during
feedback evaluation. Under task switching demands, the
stimulus--response associations would need to be re-mapped to
respond appropriately and higher activation during feedback
evaluation would be expected if the High IQ participants
attempted to reconﬁgure these mappings before they were
required to make a response. Again this is consistent with the
detailed response planning reported by the High IQ participants
during the postexperiment debrieﬁng sessions.
The inferior parietal lobe (BA 40) which was also more
strongly activated by High IQ participants during feedback
evaluation has been related to an attentional role during
cognitive set shifting tasks (Berman et al. 1995; Lauber et al.
1996; Smith et al. 2004). One interpretation of the current
ﬁndings is that as a consequence of greater parietal activation
during feedback evaluation (contradictory to the neural
efﬁciency hypothesis), relatively less activation was required
for High IQ participants during response selection (consistent
with the neural efﬁciency hypothesis). In other words, High IQ
individuals may have launched greater cognitive resources to
support advanced planning of the next response. In a review of
structural imaging studies, BA 40 featured frequently as
a discrete Brodmann area associated with intelligence/reason-
ing (Jung and Haier 2007). Our interpretation is that the
inferior parietal regions (together with caudate nuclei) support
strategizing in the High IQ participants who as a consequence
(i.e., having hypothesized a candidate rule and planned
forthcoming response mappings) faced less difﬁculty with
prepotent responses and responded faster than the Average IQ
participants on the next trial. Consistent with this notion, EEG
studies of problem solving show development of better
strategies and more parietal activity in high ability participants
compared with lower ability participants who rely more on
frontal regions (Gevins and Smith 2000) and working memory
(Jausovec and Jausovec 2004b). It has been proposed that as
memory retrieval becomes more automatic it is processed in
the posterior temporal and parietal perceptual system rather
than the frontal cortex which supports more effortful retrieval
(Petrides 1998; Koch et al. 2006).
Reconciliation of Extant Neural Efﬁciency Literature
In general, PET and fMRI studies involving working memory
and mental imagery/rotation show reduced activation in more
proﬁcient participants (Haier et al. 1988; Haier et al. 1992;
Kosslyn et al. 1996; Rypma and D’Esposito 1999; Rypma et al.
2002; Rypma et al. 2005) and are often taken as support for the
neural efﬁciency hypothesis. Close scrutiny, however, suggests
that such an interpretation is sometimes less straight-forward.
For example, Haier et al. (1992) observed negative correlations
between the learning-related change in glucose metabolism
rates during a visual object rotation (‘‘Tetris’’) task performed
before and after practice (consistent with neural efﬁciency)
but positive correlations between IQ score and glucose
metabolism rates during the initial task performance session
(inconsistent with neural efﬁciency). In addition, Rypma et al.
(2002) showed that task difﬁculty can affect activation within
the working memory-related dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPFC)
and ventrolateral prefrontal (VLPFC) regions. Higher perform-
ing participants showed less DLPFC activation during delay and
retrieval periods for the easier (2-item) trials compared with
the more difﬁcult (8-item) trials. A different pattern was
observed in lower performing participants during the encoding
periods in whom there was greater VLPFC activation for the
easier compared with the more difﬁcult items (Rypma et al.
2002). Task difﬁculty can therefore inﬂuence patterns of neural
activity. For example, a task difﬁculty by group interaction was
observed in a working memory study in which high-capacity
participants showed larger activation differences in anterior
cingulate and inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44/45) between simple
and more complex reading tasks compared with low-capacity
participants (Osaka et al. 2004)—speciﬁcally, a simple task
produced less activation, whereas the more complex task
produced more activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus in
high but not low working memory capacity individuals. It
therefore appears that the neural efﬁciency hypothesis receives
support when tasks are relatively simple to perform (but not
when task complexity increases).
Imaging ﬁndings from tasks demanding more complex
reasoning tend to go against the neural efﬁciency hypothesis.
Table 2
High IQ versus Average IQ group differences in activation during feedback evaluation events
(1stNF, 2þNF, 1stPF, 2þPF)
Anatomical region Talairach (xyz )B A m m
3
1stNF
High IQ [ Average IQ
Right caudate nucleus 14 17 3 — 4241
Left caudate nucleus  14 17 3 — 3405
Medial frontal gyrus ±7 10 51 6 5882
Right thalamus 11  11 9 — 3768
Left postcentral gyrus  29  32 42 3 4913
Right superior parietal lobule 23  55 45 7 6946
Left fusiform gyrus  48  58  12 37 4474
Right fusiform gyrus 25  65  10 19 3663
Lingual gyrus ±4  80  3 18 4325
21NF
High IQ [ Average IQ
Right medial frontal gyrus 7 23 45 6 3787
Posterior cingulate gyrus ±3  28 30 23 1573
Left inferior parietal lobule  41  33 41 40 3042
Left fusiform gyrus  43  53  15 37 1477
Left superior parietal lobule  26  61 46 7 3190
Right superior parietal lobule 23  62 49 7 2892
Left precuneus  4  62 49 7 2300
Right precuneus 6  65 40 7 2071
Lingual gyrus ±3  80 5 17 1872
1stPF
High IQ [ Average IQ
Left fusiform gyrus  36  53  15 37 3419
Right fusiform gyrus 29  66  6 37 2539
Lingual gyrus ±3  76 5 17 4427
21PF
High IQ [ Average IQ
Right caudate nucleus 13 21 4 — 1867
Right superior parietal lobule 24  58 48 7 3851
Left superior parietal lobule  25  67 48 7 5031
Right fusiform gyrus 43  70  8 19 6669
Left fusiform gyrus  33  70  8 19 5136
Lingual gyrus ±3  76 5 17 3887
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Advanced Progressive Matrices scores) demonstrated stronger
recruitment of the lateral prefrontal (bilateral BA 44/45/46/9/
10) and bilateral parietal lobes (BA 40) during the more
challenging trials of a 3-back working memory task (Gray et al.
2003). No relationship between ‘‘gF’’ and brain activity was
observed for the simpler trials, but activity during correct
responses to the more difﬁcult lure trials was positively
correlated with individuals’ ﬂuid ‘‘gF’’ scores. In addition timing
differences in activation proﬁles were noted (e.g., left lateral
prefrontal): in particular a stronger but shorter duration of
activation among higher ability participants.
Thus the difﬁculty of the cognitive task as well as the point
and period of measurement appears to inﬂuence the degree
to which differences between high and low ability participants
are detectable. Furthermore, IQ-related activation differences
in the present study appear to underlie the adoption of
different strategies between High IQ and Average IQ individ-
uals in an attempt to optimize task performance. This is
consistent with interpretations in earlier studies of individual
differences (Haier et al. 1992; Rypma and D’Esposito 1999;
Reichle et al. 2000; Ruff et al. 2003; Rypma et al. 2005), which
proposed greater strategy-shifting ability (Prabhakaran et al.
1997) or better prioritizing of cognitive processes (Rypma et al.
2002) in higher performers. Some authors also consider neural
efﬁciency to reﬂect nonuse of brain regions irrelevant for
good task performance and more focused use of speciﬁc
task-relevant areas (Jausovec and Jausovec 2004b) or entirely
different neural circuits (involving less prefrontal regions) in
more intelligent individuals (Haier et al. 2003). Also, a recent
study showed that individuals with greater working memory
capacity capitalized on the additional processing time available
during a delay interval in order to achieve faster performance
on subsequent trials (Rypma and Prabhakaran 2009). This is
entirely consistent with the pattern of results observed in the
present study—higher IQ participants appear to have made
better advantage of the delay between feedback and the start of
the next trial to help plan their actions and thus execute their
responses more quickly.
Implications for Imaging Research on Executive Function
in Disordered Populations
Understanding the way in which IQ inﬂuences executive
functioning has important implications for research on
disorders such as schizophrenia and autism where frontal/
executive deﬁcits are core and enduring clinical features
(Weinberger and Berman 1988; Frith 1992; Russell et al. 1997).
Although it is widely accepted that schizophrenia and autism
are associated with deﬁcits in executive function (Johnson-
Selfridge and Zalewski 2001; Hill 2004), the present study
conﬁrms that intellectual function too could have an inﬂuential
role in the patterns of brain activation. Some of the current lack
of consensus about brain activation during executive function-
ing in schizophrenia (Barch 2006; Pomarol-Clotet et al. 2008)
could therefore be due to a potential confound of different IQ
levels in between schizophrenia patients and healthy controls.
When studying executive function deﬁcits in clinical popula-
tions, neuropsychological and imaging studies of schizophrenia
typically match patients and comparison participants on
number of years of education, socioeconomic status and
premorbid IQ. The present study indicates that current IQ
differences alone can lead to radically different fMRI activation
patterns as well as different response strategies. This implies
that studies of disordered populations could beneﬁt from more
careful consideration of differences in current IQ. One
approach has been to ‘‘partial out’’ the effect of current IQ as
a covariate in an attempt to increase the power of detecting
imaging differences due to the disorder itself. As the mean of
these current IQ covariates would likely differ between the
patients (who typically have relatively lower current IQ) and
controls, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) would both reduce
the error term as well as adjust the mean on the dependent
variable (imaging regressor). The present study however shows
that using ANCOVA would not be advisable as the covariate
interacts with the within-subject imaging conditions. Consider
for example a voxel located in the caudate nucleus (see
Fig. 2D) whose activity during feedback events is greater for
High IQ compared to Average IQ participants, but whose
activity during response selection conditions does not differ
between High IQ and Average IQ participants. Because there is
only one covariate value for a given participant, the ANCOVA
model would not be able to appropriately use the covariate to
adjust the means for such a voxel. If for example, the covariate
adjusted the means upward for the Average IQ participants,
then this would appear to ‘‘partial out’’ the IQ effect for the
feedback conditions, but it would also adjust the means upward
and introduce spurious group differences for the response
selection conditions. Thus under the ANCOVA model, activa-
tion in this voxel might disappear for the feedback conditions
but appear for response selection conditions. To illustrate this
further, we calculated the correlations between participants’
IQ scores and signal change in caudate nuclei for each of their
imaging conditions. There were positive correlations (average
r = 0.47 ± 0.06) between IQ and caudate activation for each of
the feedback conditions, however correlations for the response
selection conditions were either low or negative (average r = –
0.10 ± 0.08). Thus although it would be possible to compute
ANCOVA models of the data, the adjusted means for the
imaging parameters and resultant activation differences might
be rather difﬁcult to interpret in any meaningful way. A better
approach might therefore be to include separate control
groups matched on current IQ or premorbid IQ and to use
the pattern of results obtained to decide which imaging
differences were related to IQ decline and which were related
to the disorder itself.
Conclusion
Functional imaging studies have consistently implicated a net-
work of prefrontal and parietal regions associated with better
performance on measures of intelligence and complex
reasoning (Colom et al. 2006; Jung and Haier 2007). In the
present study, differences in frontal, parietal, occipital and basal
ganglia activation patterns suggest that an individual’s level of
intelligence can inﬂuence the strategy used to perform
complex tasks. The event-related design of the present study
unveiled how isolated processes involved in set-shifting
(strategic planning, working memory, maintenance, conﬂict
resolution, and response inhibition) were associated with IQ-
related imaging differences. Different conclusions about neural
efﬁciency could easily have been drawn from a block design
experiment where subtle but signiﬁcant differences would
have been masked. The implications of these ﬁndings are that
the brain region, task complexity (g load), and experimental
design used to image speciﬁc cognitive processes require
Cerebral Cortex March 2010, V 20 N 3 647careful consideration before any deﬁnitive conclusions about
IQ and neural efﬁciency can emerge.
Given the important differences in neural activity and
strategy employed by individuals in the present study, care
should be taken when extending ﬁndings from fMRI decision-
making studies across samples whose IQ differs by 1 or 2
standard deviations. For future studies, researchers investigat-
ing populations with potentially different IQ levels should
therefore consider controlling for these IQ differences which
may otherwise cloud interpretations.
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